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ARTICLES 
GENDER ISSUES AND THE 
PROSSER, WADE, AND 
SCHWARTZ TORTS CASEBOOK 
Carl Tobias* 
Feminist jurisprudence is burgeoning. During the 1980s, 
there has been much excellent work in areas such as legal theory 
and practice, women's legal history, and specific substantive 
fields of law. Some law faculty also have analyzed gender bias in 
legal casebooks. Moreover, the eighth edition of William Pros-
ser's renowned Cases and Materials on Torts, the most widely 
used torts casebook in American law schools, is scheduled for 
classroom use in the autumn of 1988.1 All of these developments 
make this a promising time to consider gender issues and Pros-
ser, Wade, and Schwartz. This paper is meant to begin that dis-
cussion and to contribute to the broader work on feminist issues 
m progress. 
The first section of the piece affords a general examination 
of many aspects of the Prosser casebook that involve issues of 
gender. This overview should enhance the understanding of 
readers, especially those persons not accustomed to thinking 
consciously in terms of gender, while providing a setting for the 
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Bari Burke, Lucinda Finley, 
Jean Love, Mari Matsuda, and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, to the Harris 
Trust for generous, continuing support, and to Violet Pasha for typing this Article. Er-
rors that remain are mine. 
1. See W. Prosser, J. Wade & V. Schwartz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 
1982) [hereinafter W. Prosser]. Although estimates of actual usage vary and are difficult 
to calculate accurately, it appears that most law students today learn from this casebook. 
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specific assessment in the second segment of the paper. That 
section explores how issues implicating gender can arise in the 
classroom context of learning and teaching from Prosser's 
materials on affirmative causes of action for intentional torts to 
persons and privileges to those torts. The final part reflects on 
the future of gender issues and Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz. 2 
I. A GENERAL SURVEY OF PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ 
This section is a general survey of numerous specific dimen-
sions of Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz that implicate gender. 
The examination is meant to enhance the appreciation of read-
ers who may be unaware of these gender issues and to afford a 
backdrop for the more focused analysis of intentional tort 
materials in the second part of the piece. The general assess-
ment in the first section principally explores the editors' treat-
ment of women and briefly compares certain abstract character-
istics traditionally ascribed to males with the characteristics of 
the text. 
A. TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ 
Although examples of blatant, overt sexism and gratuitous, 
2. I am greatly indebted in this article to Professor Mary Joe Frug. Her pathbreak-
ing study of J. Dawson, W. Harvey, and S. Henderson's CASES AND COMMENT ON CON-
TRACTS (4th ed. 1982) informs much of my analysis. See Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A 
Feminist Analysis of A Contracts Casebook, 34 AMERICAN U. L. REV. 1065 (1985). I sub-
scribe to a number of her ideas, especially the methodology she employs. See, e.g., id. at 
1067-74. Nonetheless, my focus is narrower than hers in certain respects. For example, I 
include less feminist jurisprudence, and my analysis of Prosser is less exhaustive. I con-
centrate on intentional torts because they are fairly representative and illustrate numer-
ous important concepts: according women intentional tort causes of action can empower 
females by, for instance, affording them a measure of protection against sexual harass-
ment in the workplace and battering in the home. Moreover, I only mean to offer con-
structive criticism of the Prosser casebook, not criticism of the late William Prosser, or 
of John Wade or Victor Schwartz, to whom all who work in the torts field are indebted. I 
also do not underestimate the difficulties entailed in editing and revising a 1300-page 
casebook in a rapidly changing area of substantive law. Furthermore, the pedagogical 
suggestions for teaching torts that I make principally implicate gender issues. For 
thought-provoking analysis of generic issues, see Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and 
Politics, 73 Geo. L.J. 875 (1985). Finally, I hope to advance discussion which explores 
ways that law schools might reduce the possibility that any members of their intellectual 
communities will feel excluded. For a list of efforts similar to this one in other substan-
tive fields and analysis of a large project on gender issues in criminal law, see, Erickson, 
38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 101 (1988). 
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derogatory commentary regarding women do appear in Prosser, 
Wade, and Schwartz, these are relatively rare.3 Most important 
are the subtler ways in which the casebook editors treat women: 
the problems are of omission rather than commission; of supply-
ing insufficient, or no, historical material; or failing to mention 
context when context is everything. 
1. Women as Characters in the Casebook 
At first glance, Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz seems to treat 
women rather favorably as characters in the casebook, especially 
in contrast to their treatment in a major contracts casebook, 
Dawson, Harvey, and Henderson." Upon closer examination, 
however, the differences in treatment become explicable or insig-
nificant, while certain deficiencies in Prosser are emphasized. 
For example, the number of principal cases in which women are 
parties constitutes a significantly larger percentage in the torts 
casebook.~ This difference may be attributable to the inherent 
nature of the two substantive areas, such as the focus in con-
tracts on commercial activity and the emphasis in torts on in-
jury.6 Moreover, in Dawson, Harvey, and Henderson, the female 
litigants appear in a marginally narrower range of life situations, 
3. There are a few examples, however, such as the editors' characterization of the 
"persistent legend that [a husband) was privileged to beat [his wife) with a stick 'no 
thicker than his thumb'" as a "gentle rule for the preservation of family peace and har-
mony." See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 140. And, these sexist comments make one 
"wonder whether men and women live on the same planet." See C. MacKinnon, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WoMEN: A CASE OF SEx D1scR1M1NATION, at 89 (1979). Cf. Frug, 
supra note 2, at 1068-69 (finding contracts casebook "cleansed of any gratuitously nega-
tive comments about women"). In fairness to the current editors, John Wade, Victor 
Schwartz and William Prosser may have been responsible for the casebook's overt or 
more subtle sexist treatment of women. For example, much problematic commentary 
included in the notes and questions which accompany principal cases bears Prosser's 
imprint, and the current editors' failure to alter the material may reflect respect for 
Prosser who substantially influenced the development of modern tort law. 
4. See Frug, supra note 2, at 1076-94. 
5. "Only thirty-nine of the 183 major cases in the [contracts] casebook contain 
women." Frug, supra note 2, at 1077. By contrast, nine of the nineteen principal cases in 
the Prosser casebook's materials on affirmative causes of action for intentional torts to 
persons contain women. 
6. In both areas, the number of women parties may leave a mistaken impression, 
because in some cases male parties are involved, while in others the women lack an inde-
pendent presence as women because they are suing with their husbands. See, e.g., infra 
notes 12-19 and accompanying text; Frug, supra note 2, at 1077 n.23 and accompanying 
text. 
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such as their occupations, 7 and are depicted in minimally more 
stereotypical and unflattering ways, 8 but these clearly are mat-
ters of degree not kind. Indeed, in Prosser, there are remarkably 
few women parties who seem to have admirable qualities or to 
warrant readers' respect. (I mean women who appear to be rea-
sonable or normal human beings, not Eleanor of Aquitaine, Joan 
of Arc, or Marie Curie). Instead, numerous female parties pursue 
what appears to be frivolous, vindictive, or unsubstantiated liti-
gation or otherwise seem to be crazy, inconsiderate or weak 
people.9 
Perhaps most important to Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz's 
treatment of women, however, is the casebook's silence respect-
ing considerations of great saliency to women. 10 A valuable, gen-
eral example of this phenomenon is the effective failure to treat 
in the intentional tort materials intentional torts in the family, 
such as wife battering or marital rape, or in the workplace, such 
as sexual harassment, which in American society are ubiquitous 
and fundamental to women.11 
More specifically, the two decisions comprising the entire 
block of material on assault are illustrative of opinions in which 
the authors of the cases and the editors of the casebook delete 
pertinent historical information that is particularly significant 
for women. The 1348 date of I de S et ux. v. W de 812 might 
excuse the failure to explain why "I de S and M, his wife, com-
plain[ ed of] an assault upon the said M" for which "assault a 
man shall recover damages," even though one may wonder why 
7. Compare Frug, supra note 2, at 1077-83 with infra notes 9, 90-91, 102 and accom-
panying text. 
8. Compare Frug, supra note 2, at 1083-87 with infra notes 9, 88-89, 115 and accom-
panying text. 
9. See, e.g., infra notes 89-91, 135-41 and accompanying text. I am not saying that 
every woman or female party has to be superwoman or meet "male" notions of auton-
omy, independence, or rationality. I only mean to ask why so many women parties ap-
pear unusual. 
10. Professor Frug found corresponding silence in the contracts casebook. See Frug, 
supra note 2, at 1087-93. 
11. Some of these ideas are mentioned. See, e.g., W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 65 n.2, 
138-40. Their effect is reduced or vitiated, however, by de-emphasis, ineffective place-
ment, or failure to place them in context. See, e.g., infra notes 21-28 and accompanying 
text. 
12. See At the Assizes, 1348 Y.B. Lib. Ass. folio 99, placitum 60, excerpted in W. 
Prosser, supra note 1, at 34. 
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today the only reference to a married woman in certain court 
papers is couched in the same antiquated Latin phraseology.13 It 
is difficult to understand, however, why one page away and 600 
years later similar d~ficiencies could attend Western Union Tel-
egraph Co. v. Hill. 1•· In Hill, defendant's employee made sexual 
overtures to Mrs. Hill, but her husband sued for assault. It is 
unclear whether Mr. Hill was the plaintiff because the assault 
was considered more an injury to the husband's interest in the 
inviolability of his wife's body than to the woman herself or be-
cause the Alabama Married Women's Property Acts had not yet 
removed the wife's common law disability to sue on her own be-
half.111 The opinion's author and the casebook editors provide no 
information, and this silence has important implications. At 
best, it suggests that Mrs. Hill was dependent on her husband 
even to pursue tort litigation for injuries she suffered, and at 
worst it depicts Mrs. Hill as her husband's chattel.16 Because 
some students are surprised and others are shocked to learn that 
wives only recently have been empowered to bring certain types 
of suits on their own behalf in numerous states, the omission of 
this important information could allow the students to remain 
unaware and insensitive to the continuing consequences of these 
difficulties.17 The failure to mention the Married Women's Acts 
also represents a lost opportunity, because these statutes are sig-
nificant to doctrinal developments in substantive areas of tort 
law important to women, such as interspousal tort immunity 
and consortium.18 Moreover, the relevant history, especially of 
women's legal status in America before enactment of the legisla-
13. Id. For a recent example, see Robert P. Smith, et ux. v. United States, et al., 106 
S.Ct. 875 (1986). 
14. See 25 Ala. App. 540, 150 So. 709 (1933), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, 
at 35. 
15. "The action in this case is based upon an alleged assault on the person of plain-
tiff's wife by one Sapp, an agent of defendant .... " Id. 
16. In fact, Mrs. Hill could have pursued her own litigation, because Alabama was 
one of the first states to permit women, to sue husbands who assaulted them in tort. See 
Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917). 
17. For analysis of the history of how wives were empowered to bring their own 
suits, see Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of 
Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wisc. L. REV. 55. 
18. For the Acts' significance for abolition of interspousal tort immunity, see Tobias, 
Interspousal Tort Immunity In America, 22 GA. L. REV. No.2 (unpublished manuscript; 
forthcoming Spring, 1988). For analysis of the Acts, see N. Basch, IN THE EYES OF THE 
LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); 
Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983). 
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tion, is crucial to understanding why wives have had so little le-
gal or actual power at common law or in the family. 19 Further-
more, readers who are cognizant of that history may be offended 
by the editorial omission of material pertinent to women. 
Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz neglects additional considera-
tions of substantial consequence to women. New or developing 
areas of substantive tort law, such as some fields of product lia-
bility and the areas of wrongful discharge and sexual harassment 
in the workplace, essentially are not discussed.20 When certain 
issues significant to women are mentioned, the effect of doing so 
may be vitiated or reduced, because the treatment is cryptic or 
out of context. For instance, the discussion accorded inter-
spousal immunity under the "discipline" section of privileges21 is 
so terse as to be ineffective, if not confusing or misleading. 22 
Similar difficulties plague the casebook's treatment of other doc-
trinal developments important to women, such as parent-child 
immunity and a wife's cause of action for loss of her husband's 
consortium, which was not recognized by any jurisdiction in the 
United States until 1950. 28 
Several problems of context are illustrated by inclusion in 
the chapter on "causation in fact" of Sindell v. Abbott Labora-
tories. 24 Sindell was one of many cases in which daughters of 
women who ingested diethystilbestrol (DES) to prevent miscar-
19. For analysis of that history, see Olsen, supra note 17; Powers, supra note 17. 
Professor Frug found deficiencies similar to those described above in the contracts 
casebook. See Frug, supra note 2, at 1088-89. 
20. In fairness, certain of these developments are quite new, and it is unclear pre-
cisely what direction the law will take. For example, Professor MacKinnon has argued 
cogently that recognition of a tort cause of action for sexual harassment is inadequate, 
because it fails to acknowledge that the behavior is gender discrimination. See C. Mac-
Kinnon, supra note 3. Moreover, the casebook does mention some of the developments. 
See, e.g., W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 201 n.5 (discussing doctors' failure to warn pa-
tients of risks of failing to have pap test or to have Dalkon Shield removed). 
21. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 138-40. 
22. See infra notes 45, 148-49 and accompanying text. 
23. The 1950 date of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), 
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), is a telling comment on the causes of action each 
spouse was entitled to pursue. Prosser does afford some of the background, although the 
editors' views of the history and its impact as well as the future differ from mine. See W. 
Prosser, supra note 1, at 1207-08; Tobias, supra note 18. The parent-child immunity 
discussion under privileges which is similar to that on interspousal immunity is in W. 
Prosser, supra at 138-40. 
24. See 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 
(1980), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 290. 
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riages developed cervical or vaginal cancer.211 By offering the 
opinion at that point with little explanation of its factual back-
ground other than a pasteurized excerpt alluding to a cancer the 
plaintiff developed,28 it will be difficult for students to under-
stand what is at stake factually, substantively, or as a matter of 
product liability law. Indeed, it may be virtually impossible for 
students to comprehend that considerable recent product liabil-
ity litigation has involved products, like DES, the Dalkon Shield 
and tampons, which are significant to women's reproduction, or 
to appreciate that cosmetics, products which are important to 
many women, essentially are unregulated.27 All of these consid-
erations implicate crucial issues for women of sexuality and re-
productive freedom. 28 
2. Women in the Language of, and as Authors in, Prosser, 
Wade, and Schwartz 
The terminology employed in the casebook does not fully 
recognize women. Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz, as well as writ-
ers of opinions and of secondary materials included in the 
casebook, rely almost exclusively on masculine pronouns to de-
scribe the generic person. The authors of cases employ such pro-
nouns to elaborate the substantive rules of law even as they ap-
ply to women litigants. 29 Although historical usage may explain 
25. See id. at 290-91. For thorough discussion of one of these cases, see J. Bichler, 
DES DAUGHTER (1981). 
26. I realize that no student will think that any cancer is innocuous; however, the 
peculiar locus of this cancer and its terrible consequences for women can be obscured or 
lost by the unnecessarily pasteurized treatment. 
27. For the legislation "regulating" cosmetics, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 361-63 (1972). For 
more analysis of regulation, see Page & Blackburn, Beyond The Looking Glass: Admin-
istrative, Legislative And Private Approaches To Cosmetic Safety Substantiation, 24 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 795 (1977). For discussion of the Dalkon Shield, see M. Mintz, AT ANY 
COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985). For discussion of 
Toxic Shock Syndrome which resulted from use of tampons, see infra note 69. 
28. For full discussion of women as characters in a contracts casebook which reaches 
similar conclusions, see Frug, supra note 2, at 1076-93. 
29. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979), excerpted in W. Prosser, 
supra note 1, at 197, in which the opinion's author states the general proposition that 
"Anglo-American Law starts with the premise of thoroughgoing self-determiiiation, each 
man considered to be his own master" and elaborates all of the specific substantive and 
proof requirements by employing masculine pronouns. Accord Flake v. Greensboro News 
Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 1085. For 
similar conclusions as to pronoun use in a contracts casebook, see Frug, supra note 2, at 
1094. 
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this practice, Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz fail to exercise their 
prerogatives as editors to recognize women in other ways. 30 One 
egregious example of this problem is opinions which include un-
necessary, denigrating observations regarding females that are 
flatly irrelevant to resolution of the cases and to the parties (all 
males) involved. In Lipman v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad 
Co.,31 the plaintiff could fairly be described as a bore who pro-
voked a conductor into insulting him. Nonetheless, the case in-
cludes several passages, invoking the imagery of "cultivated and 
refined" Southern women on pedestals whom the railroad has an 
obligation to protect against "general obscenity, immodest con-
duct, or wanton approach."32 Although this may not offend all 
readers, the characterization of women in Campbell v. 
Weathers33 is more degrading. In that opinion, a past and pro-
spective male customer who had purchased nothing was injured 
when using the store owner's bathroom. In ruling on the plain-
tiff's claim, the judge made the completely extraneous observa-
tion that "women do a great deal of shopping [and] sometimes 
shop all day in their favorite stores and fail to make a single 
purchase," unnecessarily invoking the image of woman as mind-
less consumer.34 
Similar difficulties also appear in the casebook editors' own 
material. In the notes and questions following principal cases in-
cluded in Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz, male characters sub-
stantially outnumber the women, and the male pronoun is em-
ployed more often than the female when a character is not 
described in a gender-neutral term, such as doctor or lawyer.311 
30. I am not saying that the editors should delete masculine pronoun use when that 
was the historical practice. For example, omitting masculine pronouns from an 1850 
opinion might mislead readers about certain aspects of women's legal history that are 
relevant to understanding the history but that today are indefensible. 
31. See 108 S.C. 151, 93 S.E. 714 (1917), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 
57. 
32. See id. at 58-59. 
33. See 153 Kan. 316, 111 P. 2d 72 (1941), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 
497. 
34. See id. at 498. The judge added that "men frequently, during spare moments, 
[read: when they are not running the world] step into a place of business, which they 
patronize regularly" although they do not intend to make a purchase at that time. See 
id. 
35. See, e.g., the notes and questions included in the first chapter of W. Prosser, 
supra note 1, at 1-16. For one exception to this practice, see infra notes 111-33 and 
accompanying text. 
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Most important, however, when the casebook authors choose to 
use women characters, they more frequently than men appear in 
an unflattering or stereotypical light. For instance, the shoppers 
invariably are female and the physicians male.38 
Moreover, Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz leave the impres-
sion that writers of opinions and of secondary legal materials are 
all men. Practically no decisions included in the casebook were 
authored by woman judges, although the editors enable readers 
to discern that fact only by including pictures of judicial deci-
sionmakers, 52 out of 52 of whom were male.37 Correspondingly, 
numerous explicit references inform, while a number of hints 
suggests to, readers that legal scholarship is an overwhelmingly 
male domain.38 The illustrations of the heroes of tort law, such 
as Holmes, Cardozo, and Traynor, and of legal writers, like Dean 
Bohlen and the all-male 1962 contingent of the Committee of 
Advisers to the Reporter for the Restatement of Torts furnish 
concrete reminders of who dominates torts scholarship. 39 
Much of the discussion above is what this writer assumes to 
be the good faith attempts by the editors to be responsive to 
women. For instance, a casenote near the beginning of the negli-
gence chapter proclaims that use of the term "reasonable man" 
currently is outmoded: "Courts have traditionally referred to 
this mythical person in the masculine gender. Obviously, this 
form of description is now outdated. The form used here is the 
36. See, e.g., the notes and questions following one of the principal cases on medical 
malpractice in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 196. For similar conclusions as to a contracts 
casebook, see Frug, supra note 2, at 1095-96. 
37. See, e.g., W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 155 (photograph of Judge Learned Hand); 
id. at 244 (photograph of 1972 Oregon Supreme Court). For a comprehensive list of illus-
trations of judges, see id. at xxi. The editors do not include the first names of authors of 
opinions. 
38. In contrast to the editors' gender-blind treatment of authors of opinions, the 
editors often do indicate the gender of legal writers, usually by including their first 
names. See, e.g., W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 254 n.5 ("Sir James" Mansfield); id. at 298 
n.1 ("Francis" Bacon, Lord Chancellor); id. at 229 n.4 ("Leon" Green). For similar con-
clusions as to a contracts casebook, see Frug, supra note 2, at 1096. 
39. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 215 (illustration of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.); 
id. at 214 (illustration of Benjamin Cardozo); id. at 740 (photograph of Cardozo); id at 
758 (photograph of Roger Traynor); id. at 512 (photograph of Francis Bohlen); id. at 761 
(photograph of 1962 Restatement Committee of Advisers). For more discussion of the 
issues in this paragraph from a different angle, see infra notes 58-61 and accompanying 
text. 
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reasonable, prudent person."40 These declarations seem disin-
genuous, however, when readers discover that references to the 
"reasonable man" remain in the casebook's notes and that use of 
male pronouns to describe generic persons is peculiarly perva-
sive in those notes immediately following the declarations41 and 
given the overwhelmingly male pronoun use and the less than 
sensitive treatment of gender issues in the remainder of the 
casebook."2 
3. The Placement of Cases and Materials Involving 
Women 
The ways in which Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz organize 
their casebook and position opinions involving women parties 
may have gender implications, suggesting that females have in-
ferior status in society.43 Some difficulties with the casebook's 
organization already have been mentioned. 44 Examples of other 
problems, however, can be afforded. For instance, placement of 
the interspousal immunity material under the discipline section 
of privileges in the casebook comes too late for readers to appre-
ciate important considerations, such as the consequences of in-
tentional torts within the family. 0 Deferring comprehensive 
treatment to chapter 12 means the material may receive no cov-
erage.46 Nearly identical problems attend editorial treatment of 
parent-child immunity.47 Most importantly, readers may fail to 
appreciate fully certain gender implications of that immunity. 
40. W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 161 n.2. 
41. For examples of reference to the "reasonable man" that remain in the notes, see 
id. at 163 n.7, 171 n.3. For examples of pervasive use of male pronouns in the notes, see 
id. at 163 nn. 4, 6, and 8, 167 nn. 3 and 5. 
42. For an analysis of women as authors and in the language of a contracts 
casebook, see Frug, supra note 2, at 1094-99. 
43. For an analysis of how casebook organization and positioning of opinions can 
have important gender implications generally and in the context of a contracts casebook, 
see Frug, supra note 2, at 1098-03. 
44. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (treatment of issues important to 
women vitiated or reduced because cryptic or out of context). 
45. See supra notes 11, 23 and accompanying text. 
46. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 643-48. Similiar difficulties obtain with the 
Married Women's Acts. See supra notes 15-19. Indeed, the wife's consortium action is 
not treated until page 1208 of W. Prosser. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
47. Parent-child immunity, mentioned at supra note 23 and accompanying text, is 
treated briefly in W. Prosser's discipline section, at pages 138-40, and more fully at pages 
648-53. 
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Children only have been permitted to sue their parents in tort 
since the 1960s, although parent-child immunity was not 
plagued by the merged legal identity of husbands and wives that 
afflicted interspousal immunity but rather was created essen-
tially out of whole cloth in a trilogy of cases decided at the turn 
of the twentieth century."8 In Roller u. Roller,"9 one of the trio, 
the court refused to allow a fifteen year-old young woman to 
bring a tort suit against her father for rape, because such litiga-
tion could disrupt familial harmony!110 Even though the idea that 
placement of cases may have gender consequences cannot be 
proved definitively, several examples drawn from the intentional 
tort material suggest that placement can have such implications. 
One is the juxtaposition of opinions involving male parties with 
those involving female litigants in which courts reach different 
substantive results: a male plaintiff may be denied an inten-
tional tort cause of action in one case or note even as a female is 
afforded a cause of action in an adjacent or nearby opinion or 
note, because she appears vulnerable or overly sensitive.111 Such 
treatment can reinforce the view that women are weaker or even 
subordinate.112 A similar message is sent by placement of the in-
tentional tort block of materials at the beginning of the 
casebook and by the organizational structure employed within 
discrete areas. For example, because the intentional tort causes 
of action essentially are about adjusting power in relationships, 
when women achieve disproportionate success in pursuing such 
claims, readers can be reminded that they historically had less 
power.113 More specifically, nearly all of the cases included in the 
48. For thorough treatment of parent-child immunity including its history, see Hol-
lister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine In Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 489 (1982). 
49. See 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). 
50. See id. In fairness, this case and most of the developments examined in the text 
accompanying note 48 supra are mentioned in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 651-53. But 
the treatment is too late and too little. For example, the absurdity of Roller can be lost 
by readers when buried in a casenote at page 651 with a citation followed by the paren-
thetical statement: "15 year-old girl attempting to bring a tort claim against her father 
for rape." 
51. For example, compare the unsuccessful male plaintiff in the principal case of 
Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 
1, at 61, with the large number and percentage of successful females in the casenotes 
following Harris, W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 65-67. 
52. For similar conclusions regarding a contracts casebook, see Frug, supra note 2, 
at 1098-01. 
53. Women appear to achieve disproportionate success in the materials on the false 
imprisonment and mental distress causes of action. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 37-
506 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:495 
notes introducing historical material on the independent cause 
of action for mental distress involve females who appear gullible, 
stupid, or weak, thus reaffirming notions of women's 
inferiority. 114 
B. THE "MALENESS" OF PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ 
If a torts casebook could be described in terms of character-
istics traditionally considered female or male, Prosser, Wade, 
and Schwartz appears more male than female. 1111 Assuming that 
"emotional intellect, attachment, compassion, and spontaneity 
seem feminine [while] analytical intellect, detachment, auton-
omy, and control seem masculine,"118 an important feature of the 
torts casebook is that it appears analytical and abstract in 
nature. 117 
There are several ways in which Prosser, Wade, and 
Schwartz seems analytical and abstract. One telling example of 
the impersonal, abstract and, indeed, male character of the 
casebook is its illustrations,118 which fulfill the adage that one 
picture is worth a thousand words. All of the illustrations of peo-
ple, including the legal heroes, torts scholars and judges, are 
49; 50-70. I realize this idea is a two-edged sword: readers also may view women's dispro-
portionate success as a sign of empowerment. See infra notes 111-33 and accompanying 
text. 
54. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 53-54. This also is true of numerous other notes 
included in the materials on mental distress. See, e.g., id. at 65-67. 
55. I realize that this way of conceptualizing a casebook may be debatable and will 
trouble some readers. I ask those who disagree, or are uncomfortable with the conceptu-
alization, to read and evaluate on their merits the substantive propositions to which the 
characterizations male or female are attached. I do not subscribe to all of Professor 
Frug's ideas, although I rely substantially here on her work, especially her introductory 
explanation of the maleness of the contracts casebook. See Frug, supra note 2, at 1103-
05. 
56. See Frug, supra note 2, at 1105. I agree with Professor Frug that these "qualities 
are [not) essential to either sex [and] would argue that they are not" but that they de-
scribe "my impressions of the way many people understand the content of gender." Id. 
at 1105 (citation omitted). 
57. For analysis of this feature in a contracts casebook, see Frug, supra note 2, at 
1105-09. 
58. Professor Frug found that the "idea of using illustrations in a law casebook sug-
gests an editorial compassion for weary readers and a somewhat impish desire to sur-
prise," so that the idea seemed to her "feminine." See Frug, supra note 2, at 1108 (em-
phasis in original). She ultimately concluded, however, that the illustrations in the 
contracts "casebook emphasize the abstract, depersonalized quality of the book as a 
whole ... . "Id. 
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males.119 For instance, the very first illustration at page seven of 
the casebook, that of Chief Justice Shaw, the quintessential Bos-
ton Brahmin, informs readers at the outset of their study of tort 
law exactly what type of people profoundly shaped American 
tort jurisprudence.60 The depiction of sixty-one additional male 
judges might appear innocuous, until one realizes that at the 
time the casebook's seventh edition was released, Rose Bird was 
the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, probably the 
most influential court in the development of modern tort law, 
while many other women had been, or were, members of courts 
in the federal and state judicial systems.61 Omitting pictures of 
any plaintiffs can be considered detached in the sense of de-em-
phasizing or masking the fact that injuries to real flesh and 
blood people are at the core of tort law.62 These factors are ex-
emplified by one of the illustrations of objects: inclusion of pho-
tographs of the Long Island Railroad Station seems inoffensive, 
unless the reader appreciates that they may be displacing a por-
trait of Mrs. Palsgraf, who became the plaintiff in the most infa-
mous of all tort cases when she was injured in that station. 63 
59. See supra notes 37 and 39 and accompanying text. 
60. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 7. For a discussion of Shaw and his influence on 
American tort jurisprudence, see G. White, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, 35-63 
(1976); Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ?, An Intellectual Escapade in a 
Tory Vein, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 191 (1961). 
61. Thus, a photograph of the California Supreme Court with Rose Bird as Chief 
Justice might have accompanied the landmark Sindell case and perhaps offset its con-
textual deficiencies, discussed supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. Many other 
women had been or were members of courts. For example, Shirley Hufstedler served on 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from 1968 until she was ap-
pointed Secretary of Education by President Carter, while Burnita Shelton Mathews had 
sat on the District of Columbia District Court since 1950 and Constance Baker Motley 
had sat on the Southern District of New York since 1966. Correspondingly, Susie Sharp 
was a member of the North Carolina Supreme Court from 1962 until 1979, serving as its 
Chief Justice from 1975 until 1979, while Shirley Abrahamson had been on the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court since 1976. 
62. For thorough analysis of analogous ideas, see J. Noonan, PERSONS AND MASKS 
OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON AND WYTHE As MAKERS OF THE MASKS 
(1976). 
63. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 316 (picture of "scene of Palsgraf accident"). 
The case was Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), ex-
cerpted in W. Prosser, supra at 316. Cf. J. Noonan, supra note 62, at ch. 4 (more discus-
sion of case and Mrs. Palsgraf). The other illustrations of objects are marginally better. 
The St. Francis Hotel out of whose window a chair fell and struck Ms. Larson accompa-
nies Larson v. St. Francis Hotel, 83 Cal. App.2d 210, 188 P.2d 513 (1948), excerpted in 
W. Prosser, supra at 265. The illustration is at 266. There also are two photographs of 
the Morts Dock, the subject of the Wagon Mound cases, see id. at 308 and 309; two 
photographs of ships involved in the Kinsman cases, see id. at 328, and a photograph of 
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Another characteristic of the casebook which makes it seem ab-
stract and analytical is the severely edited nature of numerous 
opinions, because this characteristic encourages readers to focus 
on doctrinal analysis and the rules of substantive tort law, rather 
than the factual contexts out of which cases arise and the people 
involved in tort litigation.64 
Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz also do not admit that their 
casebook may have a perspective, leaving unstated important in-
formation.611 For instance, pertinent material regarding women's 
legal history, such as why wives only recently have been empow-
ered to bring their own suits for torts inflicted upon them and 
the relevance of the Married Women's Acts, is omitted, thus 
skewing readers' views of certain cases and the women in them.66 
Concomitantly, legal issues that currently are controversial or of 
great significance to women may be excluded or material dis-
cussing such questions may be arranged in ways that complicate 
reader comprehension.67 
In short, the overview of Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz illus-
trates that the casebook can have detrimental implications for 
women and perpetuate, and even contribute to, gender bias 
rather than help to eliminate or reduce sexism. Because this 
overview has been somewhat general, the next section affords a 
more focused analysis of gender issues that arise in the context 
of considering the materials on intentional torts. 
the Buick model that was the subject of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., see id. at 739. 
(Perhaps the explanation for choosing these objects is the same as the explanation for 
why little boys like rocks and little girls read fiction.) Consider how effective and graphic 
it might be to accompany one of the Dalkon Shield cases with the photograph of in-
trauterine devices pictured in THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES 250 (1984). 
64. For examples of these ideas, see supra notes 26, 62-63 and accompanying text. 
Professor Frug found that the organization along doctrinal lines of, and the appellate 
opinions in, a contracts casebook also encouraged readers to focus on doctrinal analysis 
and rules. See Frug, supra note 2, at 1105-09. For another view of these issues, see 
Feinman & Feldman, supra note 2. 
65. Professor Frug characterizes this, and a few characteristics described in the text 
in the paragraph immediately above, as being male in the sense of having an "authorita-
rian neutrality". See Frug, supra note 2, at 1109-13. Although I do not adopt her charac-
terization, I do agree with most of the substantive propositions to which it is attached, 
and these ideas are included in the text. See supra note 55. 
66. See, e.g., supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. 
67. See, e.g., supra notes 20-28, 43-50 and accompanying text. 
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II. A SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF GENDER ISSUES THAT ARISE IN THE 
INTENTIONAL TORT MATERIALS 
The assessment below constitutes a composite of the types 
of gender issues that have arisen in thirteen years of teaching 
the material on affirmative causes of action for intentional torts 
to persons and privileges to those causes of action, which are in 
Chapters two and three of Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz. In ex-
amining these materials, I have been selective, choosing issues 
that seem most significant in terms of the frequency with which 
they arise or the importance of the ideas they convey. 88 More-
over, the issues that arise can change from year to year, depend-
ing on numerous variables, such as class composition and size or 
intensity of student interest.69 I also do not claim that these is-
sues are representative, although my discussions with students 
and faculty over the years indicate that they are typical. 70 All I 
mean to say is that this is what I have observed in my experi-
ence;11 I invite others to relate what they have seen and to con-
tribute to ongoing discussion. 
I realize as well that the intentional torts materials are not 
the only ones that could be explored. This information does af-
ford, however, numerous advantages. It comprises the initial 
substantive block of material in a context where first impres-
sions are important.72 Moreover, it raises numerous issues that 
are similar to those that appear in additional substantive fields, 
such as negligence and strict liability. Nonetheless, examination 
of examples drawn from those areas and others in the general 
overview above illustrates that the intentional tort materials are 
68. Correspondingly, issues explored in the first section of this article generally will 
not be treated fully here, unless they were not so treated above or their frequency or 
importance warrants consideration. 
69. There obviously are many others. One is issues that are controversial or in litiga-
tion during a specific year. For instance, when Toxic Shock Syndrome was injuring nu-
merous women around 1980, that could have been considered when discussing product 
liability and federal regulation. 
70. Cf. infra note 73 and accompanying text (intentional tort materials not 
atypical). 
71. These observations are drawn from teaching the first-year torts course to classes 
ranging in size from 25 to 95 students at five law schools. 
72. There is an introductory chapter, entitled "Development of Liability Based 
Upon Fault," which is an historical overview. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 1-16. For 
selective analysis of that chapter, see supra note 60 and accompanying text; infra notes 
88-92 and accompanying text. 
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not atypical,73 although their selection may involve trade-offs. 
For example, there are certain senses in which these materials 
may be different. Intentional torts peculiarly implicate power; 
thus, according women intentional tort causes of action can em-
power fem ales while at the same time reinforcing the perception 
that they are comparatively powerless. On balance, however, the 
intentional tort materials are sufficiently important and repre-
sentative to warrant the close analysis that follows.74 
A. THE AFFIRMATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION 
1. Intent 
The first part addressing the concept of intent would have 
been relatively innocuous, even though it continued two detri-
mental aspects of the initial chapter, which provides a short his-
torical overview.711 However, the editors effectively eliminated a 
principal case raising numerous gender issues that was included 
in the sixth edition. 76 In the seventh edition, Lambertson v. 
United States77 ·displaced Spivey v. Battaglia, 78 which was rele-
gated to cryptic treatment in the casenotes following Lambert-
son. 79 Substituting a more recent opinion for an older case, 
73. There are numerous other examples. For instance, the editors commence the 
privacy chapter with an historical overview, stating that the "defendant had made an 
unauthorized use of the picture of an attractive young lady to advertise its flour" in the 
seminal case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 
(1902), discussed in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 1084. Such treatment obscures the fact 
that suit may well have been brought, because defendant, by plastering 25,000 pictures 
of the young woman in saloons and other untoward places, had reduced her "marital 
opportunities". 
74. I encourage others to analyze additional cases. For examination from a feminist 
perspective of other areas of tort law, especially negligence, see Bender, A Lawyer's Pri-
mer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 3, 21-25, 30-37 (1988). For a thor-
ough discussion of the methodology employed to analyze gender issues in a contracts 
casebook, a methodology to which I essentially subscribe, see Frug, supra note 2, espe-
cially at 1067-7 4. 
75. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 1-16. The two detrimental aspects are that male 
pronouns are used almost exclusively in the notes and that female parties in cases are 
portrayed in unflattering ways or have traits considered less laudable. The two aspects 
are discussed infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
76. That case is Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1972), noted in W. Prosser, 
supra note 1, at 23 note 2F, excerpted in W. Prosser, J. Wade, & V. Schwartz, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 19 (6th ed. 1976). 
77. See 528 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1976), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 20. 
78. See 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972). 
79. In W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 23 note 3F, the editors state that the distinction 
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which is retained in the notes, seems an eminently reasonable 
editorial decision.80 Less reasonable, yet still appearing to be 
within the bounds of editorial discretion, are that the newer de-
cision illustrates no better than the earlier one applicable princi-
ples of substantive law81 and that the older opinion appears in 
the notes only to show that distinctions between intent and neg-
ligence may have importance for running of the statute of limi-
tations. 82 Indeed, the significance of the editorial choices be-
comes clear only upon examination of Spivey. In that case, a 
husband and wife sued the wife's co-employee. During the lunch 
hour when several employees, including the woman and the de-
fendant, were seated at a work table, the defendant attempted 
to tease the woman, "whom he knew to be shy, intentionally" 
placing his arm around her and pulling the woman's head to-
ward him.83 What the defendant characterized as a "friendly un-
solicited hug" paralyzed the "left side of her face and mouth".84 
In resolving Spivey, the court compared it with another case in 
which a man was found to have the requisite intent to commit 
assault and battery on a woman in the following factual context: 
The incident complained of occurred in the early 
morning hours in a home owned by the defend-
ant. While the plaintiff was looking through some 
records, the defendant came up behind her, 
laughingly embraced her and, though she resisted, 
kissed her hard. As the defendant was hurting the 
plaintiff physically by his embrace, the plaintiff 
continued to struggle violently and the defendant 
continued to laugh and pursue his love-making 
attempts. In the process, plaintiff struck her face 
upon an object. . . . 85 
Thus, Spivey illustrates several issues important to women, es-
pecially that tort law will afford females relief against men who 
between "negligent and intentionally wrongful conduct . . . may be legally significant" 
and then ask "has the statute of limitations run" for which they cite Spivey. 
80. Of course, Lambertson was decided only four years after Spivey. 
81. In fact, although Spivey appears to have been decided incorrectly, that opinion 
illustrates better than Lambertson the difference between intentional and negligent 
behavior. 
82. The information mentioned supra note 79 is all that appears in the applicable 
casenote. 
83. See Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So.2d 815, 816 (Fla. 1972). 
84. See Id. at 816. 
85. The quotation is in Spivey 258 So.2d at 816. The case compared is MacDonald 
v. Ford, 223 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1969). 
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have injured them by abusing authority in employment relation-
ships or physical power in personal ones.86 Placing Spivey as the 
second principal case in the first substantive block of material 
could set a different tone for what follows, permitting early men-
tion, and even facilitating exploration, of issues significant to 
women.87 
The displacement of Spivey would be less troubling, if the 
editors had not also carried forward into the second chapter two 
deleterious practices employed in the first. One is the predomi-
nant use of the male pronoun in the notes following the cases, 
even when the litigants in the principal case are women.88 The 
other is that the opinions chosen involve female parties who are 
portrayed in an unflattering light or who have traits generally 
considered less laudable, if not undesirable. Thus, in the initial 
principal case on intent, Garrett v. Dailey,89 the elderly, ar-
thritic woman who sued her 6-year-old visitor for pulling out a 
chair where she was attempting to sit evokes little more sympa-
thy than the female recipient of a free ride in the fourth princi-
pal opinion in chapter 1, Cohen v. Petty.90 In Cohen, the female 
sued the driver for injuring her when he suffered a sudden, un-
foreseeable physical ailment. One woman plaintiff appears to be 
bringing frivolous litigation against a child who may not be able 
to appreciate the consequences of his acts and may be judgment 
proof, while the other seems ungrateful. Inclusion of the fourth 
principal case on intent, McGuire v. Almy,91 might offset the 
second problem of female "character." McGuire involved a cou-
rageous nurse who was injured in attempting to help her patient. 
The positive impression left by the nurse's brave behavior, how-
ever, may be undercut because the nurse then sued the patient, 
an insane person with even less capacity than a child to appreci-
86. For more discussion of these issues, see infra notes 125-33 and accompanying 
text. Indeed, Spiuey can be read as a case in which the court makes "bad law" on the 
concept of intent so as to make possible recovery by the injured plaintiff. 
87. The lost opportunity is focused sharply by contrasting Spiuey with Lambertson, 
the "boys will be boys" case, and with certain other cases included in the "intent" block, 
discussed in the next paragraph in the text. 
88. See, e.g., W. Prosser, supra note l, at 23 note 20; 27 note 3. 
89. See 46 Wash. 2d 197, 297 P.2d 1091 (1955), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 
l,at17. 
90. See 65 F.2d 820 (1933), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 10. 
91. See 297 Mass. 323, 8 N.E.2d 760 (1937), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, 
at 24. 
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ate what she was doing.92 
2. Battery 
The second component treats battery, which is the initial 
substantive cause of action for intentional torts to persons. This 
segment is similar to the first part in the sense that both re-
present lost opportunities. Cole v. Turner,93 the first battery 
opinion, is an old English case which does little to enhance un-
derstanding of the cause of action. The elements of a battery 
cause of action might be illustrated by an interspousal immunity 
case involving wife beating. Even if cases involving wife bat-
tering and marital rape were deemed insufficiently clear to war-
rant inclusion as a principal case, these pervasive problems cer-
tainly deserve mention in the notes, especially in light of the 
editors' inclusion in subsequent notes of data informing readers 
that "shoplifting is a major headache for merchants. "9• The sec-
ond principal battery case, Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, 
Inc., 911 involves one of the few minority plaintiffs in the 
casebook. The court's willingness to recognize, what in different 
circumstances, might appear a tenuous cause of action suggests 
the kind of case selection that could raise, if not emphasize, gen-
der issues. The opinion also illustrates considerations that are 
important to women, such as historical context and personal dig-
nity as the essence of intentional torts as well as the special so-
licitude exhibited by some courts for certain individuals or 
groups that have been the victims of discrimination. 96 
92. It also is important to remember that the plaintiff was a nurse, thus performing 
one of the more "stereotypical forms of women's work". See Frug, supra note 2, at 1078. 
Professor Frug finds analogous problems in the contracts casebook. 
93. See 6 Modern Rep. 149, 90 Eng. Rep. 958 (Nisi Prius 1704), excerpted in W. 
Prosser, supra note 1, at 30. 
94. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 127 n.1. Were wife battering and marital rape 
not so heinous, one might be tempted to respond by saying that wife battering is a major 
headache for two million wives annually. The editors at least should include comparable 
data on spouse abuse. Much relevant data are in Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law 
Of Force And The Force Of Law, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1657 (1981); Note, To Have And To 
Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption And The Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1255 (1986). 
95. See 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 32. 
96. Much said in this paper about gender issues appears applicable to racial minori-
ties. Analysis of Prosser, and other casebooks, in light of racial issues obviously is impor-
tant and should be undertaken; however, such an effort is beyond the scope of this 
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3. Assault 
The two principal assault cases which were discussed 
above97 involve situations in which husbands sued defendants 
who allegedly assaulted their wives. Moreover, in Hill the de-
fendant who propositioned the plaintiff's wife by offering to "fix 
her clock" (which he was obligated contractually to do) if she 
would let him "love and pet her"98 was nearly as despicable as 
the father who raped his daughter and then asserted the defense 
of parent-child immunity in the Roller99 case. Thus, both Hill 
and Roller are valuable, because they demand that even the 
most inveterate misogynist acknowledge the behavior's egre-
giousness and the inequity of denying recovery. 100 Moreover, 
students' appreciation of important implications of tort law for 
women would be enhanced by the inclusion at this point of his-
torical materials, such as information on the disabilities imposed 
at common law on wives and the gradual removal of the incapac-
ities with passage of the Married Women's Acts as well as the 
continuing relevance of much of this in areas such as wives' suits 
against their husbands for assaults inflicted by the men or 
against third parties for loss of their husbands' consortium.101 
4. False Imprisonment 
Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., the most 
important of the five principal opinions on false imprisonment, 
is troubling in several ways.102 The woman plaintiff who was em-
paper. 
97. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. 
98. See Western Union Tele. Co. v. Hill, 25 Ala. App. 540, 150 So. 709 (1933), ex-
cerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 35. 
99. See 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905), noted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 651 
n.1, discussed supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
100. In Hill, recovery was denied because Sapp, the employee, acted outside the 
scope of his employment, while in Roller, recovery was denied to preserve familial 
harmony. 
101. For sources of pertinent historical materials, see supra notes 17-18, 48. For dis-
cussion of the issues, see supra notes 11-19, 23, 45-50, 94 and accompanying text. 
102. See 404 A.2d 147 (1979), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 41. Faniel is 
most important, because it has numerous significant implications for women. The case 
also is important, however, in that it illustrates, while having the potential to obscure, 
significant substantive aspects of the false imprisonment cause of action and tort law. 
Narrower and more technical are the principal opinions preceding Faniel, Parvi v. City 
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ployed as a keypunch operator, when pressured during a work 
day by her supervisor and other management personnel, admit-
ted that she had an unauthorized telephone and agreed to ac-
company those employees on a trip to her residence where the 
equipment was retrieved.103 "Mrs. Faniel received a thirty-day 
suspension from work, but did not lose her job, and was pro-
moted several months later,"104 after which she sued her em-
ployer for false imprisonment. Thus, the plaintiff, appears to be 
not only a thief but also without gratitude. What makes the 
plaintifrs apparent stealing of the company's equipment and her 
suit against the employer subsequent to being promoted more 
problematic is that they divert attention from, and undermine 
appreciation of, two concepts important to substantive tort law. 
One is the specific idea of submission, which often is central to 
stating a false imprisonment cause of action, and the other is the 
generic notion that workplace interactions, especially between 
employers and employees, can merit special treatment in tort 
law.1011 For example, the plaintiff's apparent theft of the com-
pany's telephone and her later claim against the employer divert 
attention from the fact that the employee's exercise of truly free 
choice to accompany the management personnel may have been 
compromised by the employee-employer relationship.106 Simi-
larly, the plaintiff's apparent stealing and subsequent suit mask 
the cavalier, condescending, and unrealistic proclamation of the 
judge that "fear of losing one's job, although a powerful incen-
tive, does not render involuntary the behavior induced."107 In-
deed, the full import only can be appreciated with the realiza-
tion that the pronouncement came from a white, male judge 
with lifetime tenure regarding a black, female keypunch opera-
tor who worked for an employer whose operation, by the judge's 
of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 362 N.E.2d 960, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1977), excerpted in W. 
Prosser, supra note 1, at 39, and the principal case following Faniel, Enright v. Groves, 
560 P.2d 851 (Colo. 1977), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra at 46. 
103. See Faniel, 404 A.2d 147 (1979), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 41. 
104. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 42. 
105. I mean that the workplace is special in the sense that tort law should be sensi-
tive to the realities of the workplace and solicitous of the needs of workers, particularly 
those who may be or have been injured on the job because they have less power than 
employers. 
106. Thus, students seem unmoved by the plaintiff's explanation why she did not 
object to accompanying the supervisory personnel: "I just thought I had to go [I did not 
want to] but with Doris Powell being my supervisor, she was going and they told me I 
had to go, so I just assumed that I had to go." W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 44. 
107. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 44. 
516 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:495 
own description, smacked of the paramilitary.108 
The difficulties with Faniel may be counterbalanced some-
what by Enright v. Groves,109 the principal case that follows it. 
In Enright, the woman plaintiff refused three times to comply 
with unlawful requests by a police officer that she produce her 
driver's license, after which he grabbed her arm and took her to 
jail. Thus, the plaintiff's actions engender more respect for her 
as a person and illustrate well the type of protest and concomi-
tant submission necessary to make out a false imprisonment 
cause of action. no 
5. Intentional Infiiction of Mental Distress 
The mental distress materials generally and in specific ar-
eas, such as organization, case selection, tone, and emphasis, 
leave the impression that this cause of action implicates traits 
traditionally associated with women that also have been consid-
ered less admirable, such as being weak, emotional, or impres-
sionable. 111 For instance, the notes are full of cases in which 
women plaintiffs appear stupid or overly sensitive. The casebook 
editors ask whether protection should be afforded to the "hyper-
sensitive or idiosyncratic plaintiff'' and offer the "early 
landmark case" of an "eccentric old woman [who] believed that 
a pot of gold had been buried in her backyard and was con-
108. "An AT&T security supervisor from New York," the plaintiff's supervisor in 
"AT&T's Washington, D.C. office," and a "Chesapeake and Potomac security officer 
[from] a C&P facility in Maryland ... who had the actual authority to recover the 
equipment" seem to have spent the better part of a day recovering one piece of equip-
ment. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 42. Much mentioned in the text is lost on stu-
dents principally, I think, because they believe the plaintiff is a "bad actor". Moreover, 
the failure to afford students an appreciation that the workplace can warrant special 
consideration in tort law is not rectified, and may be exacerbated, by the mental distress 
case of Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 811 (1977), excerpted in W. Prosser, 
supra note 1, at 61, discussed infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
109. See 560 P.2d 851 (Colo. 1977), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 46. 
110. Compare the plaintiff's conduct in Enright, W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 46, 
with the plaintiff's behavior in Faniel, mentioned supra note 106. 
111. The independent cause of action for mental distress only has been recognized 
in the second half of the twentieth century. For that history and analysis of the tort, see 
Givelber, The Right To Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: 
Intentional Infiiction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 
42 (1982). 
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stantly digging for it."112 Defendant buried a pot containing 
"other contents where she would dig it up," and when she did, 
had her "escorted by a procession in triumph to the city hall, 
where she opened the pot under circumstances of extreme public 
humiliation ... which apparently further unsettled her rea-
son. "113 Indeed, pregnant women are mentioned in the casenotes 
no less than three times as the special beneficiaries of this 
tort, 114 thus evoking William Blackstone's infamous pronounce-
ment: "even the disabilities [like merged legal identity] which 
the wife lies under are the most part intended for her protection 
and benefit: so great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of 
England."m The principal cases are similar, if less obvious. 
Thus, the woman plaintiff in Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of 
Florida, 116 who alleges that she suffered grave emotional distress 
when a grocery store clerk said "you stink to me", seems to be 
pursuing frivolous or vindictive litigation and to be unduly sen-
sitive or overeacting. Moreover, one note following the case ac-
centuates its trivial nature by quoting Judge Magruder's famous 
proposition that a "certain toughening of the mental hide is a 
better protection than the law could ever be" against the irrita-
tions of daily life.117 Correspondingly, the next principal opinion, 
Lipman, 118 with its gratuitous invocation of women on pedestals 
to protect the indefensible behavior of the male plaintiff who 
provoked the railroad conductor,119 disparages women, the 
mental distress cause of action, and litigants who pursue such 
claims. But even the succeeding principal decision, Harris v. 
Jones, 120 in which plaintiff clearly was pursuing a valid claim, 
can leave inaccurate impressions. In Harris, the plaintiff em-
ployee sued his employer, General Motors and his supervisor, 
who mimicked the employee's stuttering in the workplace more 
112. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 67 n.8. The case is Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 
La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920). 
113. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 67 note 8. Other examples of weak or gullible 
women plaintiffs are in id. at 53 note 2; 66 at note 4D. 
114. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 54 note 7B; 67 note 7; 69 note 2. 
115. W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Sec. 443 (1765-69). 
116. See W. Prosser, supra note l, at 54. 
117. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 56 note 2, citing Magruder, Mental and Emo-
tional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936). 
118. See 106 S.C. 151, 93 S.E. 714 (1917), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 
57. 
119. For more discussion of Lipman, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
120. See 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, 
at 61. 
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than 30 times during five months.121 Even when the plaintiff was 
more deserving and stated two classic examples-abuse of a re-
lationship involving power and exploitation of a special suscepti-
bility-of conduct usually considered to satisfy the extremely 
outrageous behavior element of the cause of action, the plaintiff 
lost, because he failed to prove that he had suffered severe emo-
tional distress. m The opinion thus can downplay the central sig-
nificance to the cause of action of extremely outrageous conduct 
and the two situations mentioned immediately above123 as well 
as the importance of the employment relationship to mental dis-
tress and other intentional tort cases, 124 while discrediting the 
mental distress cause of action. In short, the message conveyed 
is that mental distress litigation is disfavored: you sissy girls just 
need a tougher mental hide or tough guys do not bring mental 
distress suits. 
It is important to understand, however, that there are dif-
ferent ways to conceptualize the mental distress cause of action, 
its purposes, and elements.1H The mental distress tort currently 
is being applied to an ever-widening ambit of circumstances.126 
Integral to this expansion, and the essence of the cause of action 
in many situations, are the ideas of power, its possession by par-
ties to relationships, and rectifying relative imbalances of 
power.127 These considerations have important implications for 
women who traditionally have possessed less power in relation-
ships fundamental to them: employment and the family. Thus, 
mental distress and the other intentional tort causes of action 
might be viewed as mechanisms that could contribute to the em-
121. See id. 
122. See id. The casebook mentions the two classic examples in the notes following 
Harris, see W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 65-67. 
123. The thesis of Professor Givelber's recent article is that extremely outrageous 
conduct is the essence of the mental distress tort and that when plaintiff proves that 
element courts will find that a cause of action has been made out even if severe mental 
distress has not been proved. See Givelber, supra note 111. 
124. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. 
125. I rely substantially in this paragraph, and in my teaching of this material, on 
Professor Givelber's perceptive article, supra note 111. 
126. For this proposition and an analysis of the circumstances, see Givelber, supra 
note 111. The Prosser casebook does provide a shorter enumeration, see W. Prosser, 
supra note 1, at 65-67 notes 3-8. 
127. See Givelber, supra note 111. The Prosser casebook does allude to these ideas, 
but the treatment is not very explicit and it is buried in the notes. See W. Prosser, supra 
note 1, at 65-66 note 3. 
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powerment of women.128 Illustrative of most of these concepts is 
the developing line of cases which treats sexual harassment of 
women in the workplace as a mental distress tort. 129 Inclusion of 
one of these cases or data on sexual harassment would be valua-
ble, although numerous ideas mentioned above can be discussed 
in the classroom by assigning Professor Givelber's article on 
mental distress or excerpts from Professor MacKinnon's book on 
sexual harassment or using the existing casebook materials.130 
For example, the notes following Harris in Prosser lend them-
selves to such treatment.131 To the editors' statement that the 
"mere solicitation of a woman to illicit intercourse" does not 
state any cause of action and Magruder's observation that "there 
is no harm in asking",132 one foil is whether those ideas apply 
when the solicitor is a male faculty member or supervisor and 
the person solicited is a female student or employee.133 
B. PRIVILEGES To INTENTIONAL TORTS 
In Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz's block of material on priv-
ileges or defenses to intentional torts, women parties appear less 
frequently than in the chapter on affirmative causes of action 
governing intentional torts to persons. Moreover, the material on 
privileges has certain difficulties examined above, such as dis-
proportionate use of masculine pronouns, 134 and a few new ones. 
However, the information on consent is first and most compre-
hensive, while that material and the component on discipline 
128. I realize that the cause of action may not contribute to women's empowerment 
and even may legitimize the continuing domination some women experience while serv-
ing only to isolate others. I have said that this may well be true for wives accorded 
intentional tort causes of action against their husbands. See Tobias, Interspousal Tort 
Immunity in Montana, 47 MONT. L. REv. 23, 37 (1986). Accord C. MacKinnon, supra 
note 3; Olsen, supra note 17, at 1537-38, 1559-60. 
129. See Givelber, supra note 111, at 66-67; Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and 
Politics: Perspectiues From The Women's Mouement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 643-49 
(1986). For a trenchant criticism of this approach, finding it inadequate to sexual harass-
ment as gender-based discrimination, see C. MacKinnon, supra note 3. For a recent il-
lustrative case, see Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). 
130. See Givelber, supra note 111; C. MacKinnon, supra note 3. 
131. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 65-67. 
132. See id. at 65 n.1, citing Magruder, supra note 117, at 1035. 
133. The Prosser materials permit discussion of abuse of relationship, power, and 
susceptibility, all of which are significant to the mental distress tort. 
134. The material includes difficulties examined both in the first section of this Arti-
cle and the initial subsection of this part. For examples of continuing problems with use 
of masculine pronouns, see W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 119-21 notes 4, 6, 8. 
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implicate the most significant gender issues. Therefore, those 
two parts of the chapter on privileges warrant close scrutiny 
here. 
1. Consent 
The six principal cases on consent comprise a curious con-
tingent. Half of the cases were brought by male plaintiffs for in-
juries they suffered when participating in sporting events, while 
the other three were pursued by women plaintiffs against male 
physicians for administering medical treatment to which the fe-
males allegedly did not consent.13& Because the three doctors ap-
pear to have had "good intentions", in the sense of wishing to 
confer benefits on the plaintiffs, and because the physicians se-
cured "good results" for their patients, 138 the women may seem 
petty or their suits appear frivolous, if the females' actions are 
not placed in context. Thus, in O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship 
Co., 137 the plaintiff was one of a group of 200 immigrant women 
who failed to protest the vaccinations which permitted them to 
enter the United States. She seems meek, submissive and un-
grateful, unless one appreciates certain facts in the record on 
appeal: 
The plaintiff was 17 years old and travelling to 
the United States with her father and her brother 
in steerage. She had never before been away from 
home and had never, during the voyage, been sep-
arated from her father and brother until just 
before the vaccination procedure, when the steer-
age passengers were separated by sex and herded 
off to different parts of the ship. [She testified] 
that she held back till the last because she was 
afraid to go up, when there was no mark on her 
arm; that . . . there was no means of exit except 
where the surgeon stood; that when she got down-
stairs there was no means of getting away; the 
doctor was on the landing, and she could not go 
135. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 97-112. 
136. The medical treatment was successful in that it achieved therapeutic results 
that the doctors desired, but the treatment was administered in ways the women con-
tended were unauthorized. 
137. See 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, 
at 97. 
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up .... 
The injury of which the plaintiff complained was 
the eruption of blisters over her entire body, 
which she argued was caused by the 
vaccination.138 
521 
Correspondingly, in Mohr u. Williams, 189 the woman who filed a 
battery action against her physician for not securing her consent 
to operate on her left ear, although he operated successfully on 
that ear and had consent to operate on her right ear, appears to 
be unfairly pursuing a highly technical, and perhaps unwar-
ranted, lawsuit, until readers comprehend that this is one of the 
first cases upholding a patient's right to autonomy in the face of 
medical paternalism.140 Similarly, in De May u. Roberts,141 the 
woman, who sued her sick and overworked doctor for permitting 
a young, unmarried, male stranger to be present at her child-
birth, but without whose presence the physician might have 
been absent, seems ungrateful. This is true, unless one under-
stands that De May is the seminal case recognizing a cause of 
action for invasion of the right to privacy, a right that has as-
sumed great importance to women especially in areas involving 
reproductive freedom.10 Thus, the primary difficulties with the 
principal cases are problems of omission or failure to denote 
context. 
Although such difficulties may be hard to avoid in case-
notes, problems of commission also appear. It is interesting that, 
but unclear why, so many of the unauthorized operations were 
138. These facts are not in the excerpt of the opinion included in the casebook. 
They are in J. Henderson & R. Pearson, SUGGESTIONS FoR TEACHERS USING The Torts 
Process Second Edition at 2-3 (1981). 
139. See 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, 
at 100. 
140. Nonetheless, the plaintiff still may appear ungrateful and her suit technical. 
The doctor operated on the patient's left ear to save her the expense, danger, and 
trauma of being anaesthetized again, while the plaintiff's recovery ultimately was re-
duced from $14,000 to $39 because the operation was successful. The casebook does men-
tion that Mohr is a leading case but treats it in ways that obscure its historical signifi-
cance and context. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 103 note 3. 
141. See 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 
105. 
142. The tort cause of action for invasion of privacy differs from, but contributed to, 
the "constitutionalization" of the privacy concept in cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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performed on women.1" 8 Moreover, although the grouping of 
note cases involving women with those involving minor children 
or individuals otherwise incapable of protecting themselves may 
be simple inadvertance, that fact makes it no less demeaning. w 
Similarly troubling is the note which observes that "generally, a 
competent adult can consent for himself' but specifically asks 
whether a "husband's consent [should] be necessary for a physi-
cian to perform a hysterectomy or other sterilizing operation on 
his wife" or for the wife to have an abortion. u 5 Most problem-
atic, however, are numerous notes which appear suggestive, al-
most prurient. The "magnetic healer" and salesman of artificial 
limbs who induce women to expose themselves and the woman 
who consents to sexual intercourse in return for money paid 
with a counterfeit bill minimally advance substantive under-
standing, degrade women, and distract attention from, and even 
trivialize, issues important to women. us 
2. Discipline 
This component combines certain of the worst aspects wit-
nessed above. Even if the continuing practice of grouping fe-
males with children is ignored, the information provided is too 
little, too late. It omits the rich history of women's rights in the 
law and the importance and prevalence of intentional torts in 
the family, especially the ubiquitous nature of wife battering 
and the heinous activity of marital rape. m The material af-
143. See, e.g., W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 103 notes 3, 5; 107 note 7. Perhaps 
women were the victims of medical paternalism more than men who were more willing to 
object to medical treatment. 
144. See, e.g., W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 103-04 notes 2-9 and compare id. at 112 
note 3. with the principal case, Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal. 2d 654, 204 P.2d 1 (1949), ex-
cerpted in W. Prosser, supra at 109, in which the 18 year old boy sought protection from 
his own incapacity or inability to appreciate the consequences of being paid to box in a 
prize fight. It is interesting to note, however, that the treatises on women are located 
between those on children and the insane in most law libraries. 
145. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 104 note 8. One way that this may be offset is 
by asking whether the wife's consent is necessary for her husband's vasectomy. 
146. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 106 notes 2, 3 and 5. Similar to these examples 
is note 3A at page 112, stating that a "competent adult woman cannot maintain an ac-
tion for her own seduction when she has consented [and that] defendant's overpowering 
personality or extraordinary powers of persuasion are not tantamount to 'duress' that 
would nullify consent." 
147. The information provided is in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 138-40. For earlier 
discussion of the remaining ideas in this sentence, see supra notes 11-19, 21-23, 43-50, 94 
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forded is so cryptic, collapsing into two sentences three hundred 
years of legal history significant to women, that the information 
may serve primarily to obscure or confuse.1' 8 It may leave a mis-
taken impression by: first, stating that at some indefinite, im-
plicitly antediluvian, date in the past, husbands were privileged 
to discipline their wives; second, citing to an 1824 case; and 
third, remarking that wives can recover in states where spouses 
can sue each other for personal torts. 149 The material can convey 
the impressions that interspousal immunity for intentional torts 
and wife battering are dead issues or the unfortunate products 
of a bygone era, although tort immunity still survives in numer-
ous jurisdictions while an incredible number of wives are beaten 
by their husbands during marriage.m Finally, if the significant 
omission of information important to women were not enough, 
the editors add insult to injury, reminding readers that sexism is 
ever with us, by characterizing the "persistent legend that the 
husband was privileged to beat [his wife] with a stick 'no thicker 
than his thumb' [as] a gentle rule for the preservation of family 
peace and harmony."1111 
III. THE FUTURE OF GENDER ISSUES AND PROSSER, WADE, AND 
SCHWARTZ 
It would be presumptuous to offer much more in the way of 
possible changes in the Prosser casebook than has been sug-
gested explicitly or implicitly in the analysis above.1112 Moreover, 
there will be time enough, once the eighth edition is in print, to 
discuss and debate certain gender issues implicated by, and that 
transcend, the use of Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz. Nonethe-
less, some issues warrant brief examination here, because they 
are so important or because they will remain applicable regard-
less of how Prosser is revised. 
and accompanying text. 
148. For earlier discussion of these ideas, see supra notes 21-23, 43-50 and accompa-
nying text. 
149. See W. Prosser, supra note l, at 140. 
150. For analysis of jurisdictions that retain interspousal immunity for intentional 
torts, see Tobias, supra note 128, at 29-34. For data indicating how the Prosser materials 
can obscure the statistical realities of wife battering, see supra note 94 and accompany-
ing text. 
151. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 140. For historical treatment of "domestic 
chastisement", and "gentle restraint'', see Marcus, supra note 94, at 1658-60. 
152. These suggestions appear in the first two sections of this paper. 
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A. A LAST WORD ABOUT CHANGES IN THE CASEBOOK 
I must admit to considerable ambivalence about altering the 
casebook.1113 It may be preferable to retain some of the material 
presently included, because the information seems to lend itself 
to effective treatment or provides "grist for the mill". For in-
stance, some material appears so blatant or absurd that gender 
bias is obvious, while additional material that is less clear may 
illustrate nicely how gender issues can be subtle and complex. 1114 
Of course, I am making some assumptions about what happens 
in the classroom and about readers of the casebook that may be 
debatable or perhaps unwarranted, 11111 and these lead in turn to 
the following discussion. 
B. THE PROSSER CASEBOOK AND GENDER ISSUES IN THE CLASSROOM 
I am keenly aware that it is one thing to analyze a casebook 
in light of gender issues and quite another to raise and explore 
those issues in the context of teaching and learning from that 
casebook in the classroom. Nonetheless, both efforts have cer-
153. I also do not underestimate the difficulty of producing a casebook that would 
treat more efficaciously the gender issues discussed above. The general problems of edit-
ing and updating a comprehensive casebook in a fast-changing area like torts are sub-
stantial. More specifically, I concur with Professor Frug that "editors could conscien-
tiously eliminate all instances of female degradation in their casebooks and still produce 
books that would affect readers' views about gender and that would be subject to multi-
ple interpretations because of readers' gender attitudes." Frug, supra note 2, at 1069. I 
also agree that it "would be unrealistic and unfair to advocate abandoning this casebook 
on the grounds of my discussion." Id. at 1135. What is needed is constructive in-
terchange both about how this and other casebooks might be revised and used in ways 
that raise gender issues and reduce gender bias. 
154. For examples so blatant or absurd that gender bias is obvious, see the discus-
sions of Lipman, supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; of Weathers, supra notes 
33-34 and accompanying text; and of "domestic chastisement", supra note 151 and ac-
companying text. If for some reason the gender bias does not seem obvious, attention can 
be drawn to the examples in numerous ways. To the Southern women on pedestals in 
Lipman, one response is "horses sweat, men perspire, and ladies glow." To the women 
shopping all day and buying nothing in Weathers, one response is "shop, shop, shop 'till 
you drop, drop, drop". To the characterization as a gentle rule for preserving family 
harmony the husband's privilege to beat his wife with a stick no thicker than his thumb, 
one response is "it depends on which end of the stick you find yourselr'. 
155. For example, I may be too generous in my assumption that students will appre-
ciate that certain material is sexist. Thus, it may be preferable to eliminate some mate-
rial, lest certain readers have their sexist predilections reaffirmed. For a perceptive anal-
ysis, describing a range of readers with differing perspectives on gender issues, see Frug, 
supra note 2, at 1071-74. 
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tain commonalities: complexity, subtlety and delicacy. Of over-
riding significance for me, however, is the concept of context. 
For example, I never discuss comprehensively all of the material 
analyzed in the first two sections, varying what is examined and 
how it is treated from year to year, depending on numerous con-
siderations, such as the perceived depth of student interest. 
Thus, when a student asks why Mr. Hill sues for the assault to 
Mrs. Hill, 1116 that can serve as an opportune occasion for a brief 
discussion of the common law disabilities imposed on wives. I 
also attempt to be sensitive to the dynamics operating in the 
classroom and to use cautiously my "silver bullets", because it 
seems to me that there can be too much of what I consider to be 
a good thing and that there is considerable risk of trivializing 
important gender issues.1117 Moreover, I know that all faculty 
members have considerable power over students and that cer-
tain faculty may have or choose to exercise more such authority 
than others.1118 I try to be sensitive to that power and not to use 
the authority in the classroom context. 1119 As with the Prosser 
casebook, I find instances of blatant or overt sexism in the class-
room relatively rare. Furthermore, when these situations do 
arise, they typically elicit such derision or even laughter from 
most students that it is unnecessary for the instructor to say 
anything. Most problematic, however, is how to detect and re-
spond to subtler forms of gender bias that surface less clearly, if 
at all.160 
156. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
157. For instance, Prosser's material on battery includes two note questions in 
which men touch women in ways that appear unauthorized and, thus, batteries. See W. 
Prosser, supra note 1, at 30 note 3; 31 note 6. But one seems so obvious and the other so 
silly that I treat them briefly, if at all, so as not to detract from more important material, 
such as that on wife battering or the Prosser material on assault, discussed supra notes 
94-101 and accompanying text. 
158. For instance, tenured faculty probably could treat some gender issues in certain 
ways that untenured faculty might not dare, or care, to treat them. Indeed, legion are the 
true stories that women faculty tell and are told about women faculty: 'she won't teach 
rules;' 'she does not discuss doctrine;' 'she always is talking about social policy, women's 
issues or, worst of all, feminism'. For helpful discussion of such faculty power, or lack 
thereof, and its implications for faculty generally and women faculty specifically, see 
Frug, supra note 2, at 1135-40. 
159. I try to be especially careful that students do not feel bludgeoned, embarassed, 
or ridiculed, saving my criticism for the authors of opinions. It also is important to re-
member that some students will consider a faculty member a role model, making faculty 
behavior and fair treatment of students as important as the substantive material 
conveyed. 
160. Much of this is quite delicate. For example, how can gender issues be raised 
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Finally, there are numerous teaching techniques, of varying de-
grees of complexity and subtlety, that can be employed in using 
the Prosser casebook. For instance, women can be substituted in 
the casebook's note questions or in hypotheticals or examples 
employed in class, while some teachers have compiled materials 
raising gender issues that can be used as a supplement to Pros-
ser, Wade, and Schwartz, 161 as can the new work discussed next. 
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE FOR TORT LAW 
There recently has been much valuable work in numerous 
areas that has important consequences for tort law. For exam-
ple, during the 1980's many helpful contributions have been 
made to the understanding of women's legal and non-legal his-
tory and the Married Women's Acts. 182 Some of this material 
can be integrated easily and beneficially into the discussions of 
intentional torts and other areas. 183 Correspondingly, I have 
with people who have divergent perspectives on these issues in ways that are not threat-
ening, encourage candid discussion, and which raise the consciousness of those involved? 
Another way in which these issues can be delicate is that they involve not only gender 
but sex or reproduction. Some students may feel embarassed or uncomfortable about 
discussing reproductive freedom, Dalkon Shields, DES or the "vesico-vaginal fistula 
which permitted urine to leak from plaintiff's bladder into the vagina," mentioned in 
Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979), excerpted in W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 
197. Equally problematic is that some students may find certain materials humorous, or 
even titillating. For instance, Sapp's offer to "fix Mrs. Hill's clock" can have a decidedly 
modern and suggestive ring, see supra text accompanying note 98, while the "magnetic 
healer" or seller of artificial limbs, see supra text accompanying note 146, may appeal to 
the prurient instincts of some. If such issues arise or play out in these ways, the effects 
can be harmful, or even disastrous. Moreover, a sense of timing, balance, proportion and 
good judgment are valuable but sometimes difficult to achieve. 
161. See, e.g., J. Love, Teaching Torts: A New Perspectiue Selected Cases And Ar-
ticles (Jan. 1987)(on file with author). Cf. Finley, Laying Down The Master's Tools: A 
Feminist Re-Vision Of Torts, 1 YALE J. OF L. & FEMINISM (1988) (discussion of numerous 
cases that can be used in a torts course to illustrate gender issues). Examination drafting 
affords another opportunity for raising gender issues or employing women characters to 
good effect. 
162. Helpful contributions to the understanding of women's legal history are M. 
Grossberg, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY 
AMERICA (1985); E. Pleck, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST 
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES To THE PRESENT (1987); M. Salmon, WOMEN 
AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA (1986). For helpful contributions to under-
standing of non-legal history, see the sources cited in Chused, supra note 18, at 1360 n.2. 
For discussion of the Married Women's Acts, see the sources cited supra note 18. 
163. See, e.g., supra Section II of this article. There also has been valuable work 
that has given new meaning to old ideas. One example is recent development of the 
concept of a woman's right to self-defense against men who physically threaten them. 
See Schneider, supra note 129, at 604-10. This idea can be discussed effectively when 
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been able to incorporate and use effectively in certain substan-
tive fields, work that considers those areas practically and theo-
retically, such as Professor MacKinnon's classic study of sexual 
harassment of women in the workplace.184 Moreover, some work 
that is more theoretical seems particularly appropriate to discus-
sions of alternatives to tort law which arise throughout the 
course, 1811 although inclusion of the material may well be war-
ranted at other junctures.188 
CONCLUSION 
The Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz casebook always has 
been a thought-provoking vehicle for raising issues of gender in 
tort law. Regardless of how the eighth edition is revised, this as-
pect of the casebook is unlikely to change. The challenge for the 
future is how to use Prosser in ways that most efficaciously raise 
consciousness about issues of gender and reduce sexism. I have 
attempted to open discussion and trust that others will contrib-
ute to future debate. 
considering the analogous privilege of self-defense to intentional torts. 
164. See C. MacKinnon, supra note 3. 
165. Professor Finley's, "responsibilities" analysis is a particularly cogent example. 
See Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out Of The Maternity And The 
Workplace Debate, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986). Moreover, her forthcoming work 
which considers torts from a feminist perspective promises to be very valuable. See Fin-
ley, supra note 161. 
166. More thought needs to be given to including this material in the classroom. 
The type of legal work I have in mind is exemplified by efforts such as S. Estrich, REAL 
RAPE (1987); c. MacKinnon, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) 
and Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986). The 
implications of non-legal work for tort law should be explored as well. For instance, what 
implications might the ideas of Simone de Beauvoir, Michel Foucault, or Carol Gilligan 
have? See S. De Beauvoir, THE SECOND SEX (1952); M. Foucault, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 
(1980); c. Gilligan, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
